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The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim 
is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate 
intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for 
the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of 
providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of 
the content of the experience. 
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Perceptual states exhibit a double nature, both representational and qualitative: 
they represent the world as being a certain way and they also make a peculiar 
qualitative effect on the experiencing subject. if their representational nature 
has to do with what is presented to the subject in a given sensory modality, their 
qualitative nature has to do with “what it is like” for the subject to undergo the 
peculiar perceptual experience she is undergoing. the standard way in which 
this point is expressed is in terms of properties. to say that perceptual states 
have a representational nature amounts to saying that they have representational 
properties, whereas to say that perceptual states have a qualitative nature amounts 
to saying that they have phenomenal properties. the co-presence of these two 
kinds of properties raises the philosophical question of their relation. Within 
the philosophical debate on the topic, one can distinguish three main stances 
which differ as regards the position they take towards the issues of dependence/
independence, reducibility/non-reducibility of one kind of property to the other. 
according to one position, phenomenal properties are independent (both for their 
existence and for their nature) of representational properties and irreducible 
(both explanatorily and ontologically) to them. this position, which has come 
to be known as the “two-realms conception”, conceives of the mind as a non 
unitary domain constituted by two non overlapping kinds of phenomena: on the 
one side the purely representational ones (typically: propositional attitudes such 
as beliefs and desires) and on the other side the purely qualitative ones (qualia) 
such as proprioceptive states, moods, tickles, itches and the likes. according 
to a second position, phenomenal properties depend on (or at least co-vary 
with) representational properties, but are not reducible to them. the third 
position adds a reducibility claim and maintains that phenomenal properties 
are not only dependent on (or co-variant with) representational properties, 
but also reducible to them. the last two positions are varieties of what is called 
“representationalism” in the recent philosophical debate on consciousness. as the 
label suggests, representationalism gives to the notion of (mental) representation 
the highest place of honor in the account of the mind: the mind is conceived 
as a unitary field of homogeneous phenomena and what accounts for this 
homogeneity is precisely the representational nature of all mental items. 
representationalism comes in many different varieties. an important 
distinction is that between strong and weak versions of the doctrine: whereas 
strong representationalism defends an equivalence/identity claim according 
to which phenomenal properties are but a kind of intentional properties 
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(typicallyrepresentational ones),1 weak representationalism restricts itself to 
defending a mere supervenience claim according to which two mental states 
cannot differ in their phenomenal properties unless they also differ in their 
representational properties.2 other distinctions which are drawn are: pure/
impure; narrow/wide; reductive/non reductive. Pure representationalism 
claims that phenomenal properties are identical to “pure representational 
properties” (properties of representing a certain intentional content), whereas 
impure representationalism claims that phenomenal properties are identical 
to “impure representational properties” (properties of representing a certain 
intentional content in a certain manner of representation such as in a visual 
perceptual way, in an auditory perceptual way and so on). narrow/wide has 
to do with whether the relevant representational properties are taken as 
internal or external (where a property is internal/external if it supervenes/
does not supervene on the intrinsic, non relational properties of an entity). 
the last dichotomy has to do with whether the representational properties 
to which the phenomenal properties are claimed to be identical can be 
understood and explained without appeal to phenomenal notions: reductive 
representationalism answers in the positive, whereas the non reductive variety 
of the doctrine answers in the negative.3
Here we shall confine our attention to strong and reductive representationalism 
which, according to may people, constitutes the most appealing version of 
the doctrine in so far as it avoids any kind of commitment towards intrinsic, 
irreducible properties of the experience. the main question we shall address 
is whether strong, reductive representationalism provides a satisfactory 
account of perceptual experience.4 the critical point we shall raise against this 
position is that even though it looks extremely attractive, in so far as it avoids 
any kind of commitment towards intrinsic, irreducible, qualitative properties 
of experience (qualia), nonetheless the attempt it pursues of accounting for the 
qualitative/phenomenological dimension of perceptual states only in terms 
of representational properties ends up, in our view, to promote either an 
inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of content. 
We shall structure our criticism in the following way: (§1) we shall start 
1  Supporters of strong representationalism are for example dretske (1995); lycan (1996) and 
tye (1995).
2  For this position see e.g. block (1996) and chalmers (1996).
3  For more on these distinctions see chalmers 2004.
4  it is worth stressing from the very beginning that our considerations are primarily meant to 
apply to perceptual experiences in the visual modality. So, from now on, when we talk of perceptual 
experience we will always mean visual perceptual experience. even though we think that most of 
our remarks can be generalized to other modalities, in the context of this work we prefer to remain 
neutral on the more general issue.
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by presenting a test of explanatory adequacy which amounts to a number 
of requirements which, along with other people in the debate, we take 
to be minimal, non negotiable desiderata for any theory of perceptual 
experience. the ultimate upshot of our criticism to representationalism 
is that this position should be revised, if not utterly rejected, in so far as it 
doesn’t pass the adequacy test. this conclusion will be reached in two steps 
in which we will respectively confront with one of two possible varieties 
of representationalism which differ as regards the issue as to whether a 
perceptual state has only one content (§2) or rather a multiplicity of contents 
or layers of them (§3). What we shall claim is that even though the second 
variety (multiple content representationalism) looks better than the other 
(unitary content representationalism), it also fails in so far as it proves 
unable to satisfy all the requirements stated. this negative part will be 
followed by a positive one in which we shall provide a sketch of our suggested 
proposal. in this part (§4) we shall revive a distinction (namely: that between 
representational and presentational properties), which, while being generally 
acknowledged and actually widely present within the phenomenological 
tradition, has mostly been ignored within the debate on consciousness in the 
more or less recent analytic tradition.5 With this distinction in place, we shall 
show how one could meet the explanatory adequacy test.
a good way to critically assess a theoretical position (here: strong, reductive 
representationalism) aiming at providing a given explanation (here: the 
nature of visual perceptual experience) is to lay out a set of requirements 
which can reasonably be taken as minimal,6 non negotiable conditions of 
adequacy for any such account. this is what we shall do in this section where 
we shall formulate what we call the “explanatory adequacy thesis” (eat) for 
any account of perceptual experience. according to this thesis, any adequate 
theory of perceptual experience should satisfy (at least) two requirements 
which we shall label the “particularity requirement” (Pr) and the “phenomenal 
indistinguishability requirement” (Pir). in this paper we shall assume the 
validity of (eat) without providing any argument in its support.7 
5  but see chalmers (2004).
6  We use the qualification ‘minimal’ in order not to rule out the possibility that other 
requirements are actually needed for assessing the adequacy issue.
7  actually, that an adequate account of perceptual experience should satisfy both requirements 
is a point which has been recently defended by many authors. this point is explicit in Schellenberg 
who says: “any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, 
it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the 
mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. 
Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could 
yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences” (Schellenberg 2010, 19).
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let us clarify the two requirements starting from the second one. Phenomenal 
indistinguishability amounts to the idea that a subject could undergo different 
experiences in different times/places and, despite these differences, be utterly 
unable to tell one experience from the other in so far as the way in which things 
appear to her on those distinct occasions is, from her perspective, the same. an 
example will clarify the point: let our subject S be confronted in two situations 
with two numerically different, but qualitatively indistinguishable apples 
(apple1 and apple2). even though the two apples are numerically different, 
they appear to S to be identical in so far as they have the same look (the same 
“appearance properties” as someone would say)8: they both present the same 
shade of red, the very same shape, they are of the very same size and so on.9 to 
put this point in more formal terms let us say that two experiences e1 and e2 are 
phenomenally indistinguishable for a subject S if and only if S is not able to tell 
e1 from e2, that is if and only if she cannot know, by introspection alone, that 
they are not the same.10 the adverb ‘phenomenally’ used to qualify this kind 
of indistinguishability has to do with the fact that what grounds the subject’s 
“feeling” of identity in these cases is the way in which her experiences present 
themselves to her. What this first requirement states is that an adequate theory 
of perceptual experience should not only allow for such a possibility (which, as a 
matter of fact, no one is willing to deny), but also provide an explanation of it. 
let us now consider the other requirement (Pr). as things stand, even though a 
subject could be unable in a given situation to tell one of her experience (say, e1 
in which she is confronted with apple1) from another qualitatively identical one 
(say, e2 in which she is confronted with apple2), nonetheless what the subject is 
presented with in the two cases are different particulars, namely: apple1 and 
apple 2 respectively. When S looks at apple1 what she is presented with is apple1 
itself and nothing less than that. in other words, what she is perceptually aware 
of is not the fact that there is something having certain perceptual features 
(redness/roundness/brightness) in her immediate surroundings, nor the fact 
that there is at least one apple in that area exemplifying those features. rather, 
she is presented (and it also seems to her to be presented) with that very thing 
in front of her which looks to her to be an apple. We could rephrase this point 
by saying that the subject’s perceptual experience is always an experience of 
8  See e.g. Shoemaker (1994).
9  another example of indistinguishability can be provided by considering a veridical 
perception and a hallucination. a hallucinatory experience may be, from S’s lights, 
indistinguishable from a veridical experience of her and yet the two experiences are different in 
so far as only one of them is veridical or correct.
10  For this “epistemic” characterization of the notion of phenomenal indistinguishability, see 
Williamson (1990).
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particulars in the world.11 Under this respect perceptual experiences differ 
from propositional attitude states such as beliefs and desires. take a desire 
for example. if in this case one’s desire can be either particular (S desires a 
particular item, say: that very tulip in front of her) or general (S desires an item 
of a given kind, say: a tulip of a given shape and color), in the perceptual case 
only the first situation can arise. True enough, if one sees a particular tulip, then 
there is a tulip that one sees. but what one sees is always something particular 
(a tulip which is not this or that particular tulip is not an object one can see). 
in what follows we shall distinguish two senses of particularity which will 
be put to use in our criticism of representationalism. We shall label them, 
following a current usage,12 the relational and the phenomenological sense. 
the relational sense of particularity is that according to which a perceptual 
experience is a relational state one of whose relata is the experienced 
object itself. the object a given experience is of is what is relevant to the 
characterization of the state’s correctness/veridicality/accurateness 
conditions.13 if it visually looks to me as if there is a red apple in front of me 
(apple1, say), my experience turns out to be veridical/unveridical according 
to how things are with apple1 itself (it turns out to be veridical if apple1 is 
red, false otherwise), notwithstanding how things could turn out to be with 
any other apple no matter how similar in appearance it could be to apple1 
itself. in order not to trivialize the particularity requirement in its relational 
sense, it is important to distinguish a weak and a strong reading of it and 
link the requirement with the strong one. that an experience (at least when 
veridical) is always of something is a point which everyone in the debate is 
willing to concede. a more substantial point has to do with whether the object 
a given experience is about plays a role in individuating the experience.14 
the particularity requirement in the strong reading of the relational sense 
(Prrs) is the claim that an adequate explanation of experience should account 
for the role which the object a given experience is of plays as regards the 
individuation of the experience. 
let us now move to the phenomenological sense of the particularity 
requirement (Prps). When one enjoys a given experience (when one sees apple1, 
11  See Soteriou (2000, 173).
12  actually, of the two senses we shall distinguish, the phenomenological one has not been 
widely acknowledged within the philosophical literature except for a few remarkable exceptions 
such as: martin (2002); montague (2011), Schellenberg (2010).
13  in what follows we shall use these expressions interchangeably.
14  to claim that the object a given experience is of plays a role in individuating the experience 
is to claim that if the subject were confronted with a different, albeit qualitatively identical 
object, she would enjoy a different experience with different veridicality conditions. 
the Content anD PhenoMenoLogY of PeRCePtUaL exPeRIenCe
eliSabetta Sacchi università Vita-Salute San raffaele 
193
say) one not only happens to be related to apple1; rather, one’s being so related 
is something that figures in the very phenomenology of one’s experience (one 
seems to be presented with that particular thing which looks to one to be an 
apple). to put it in different terms, we can say that the particularity that one’s 
experience involves is reflected in the way in which things phenomenally look 
to one (to use Jackson’s terms we could say that the experienced particularity is 
part of the “phenomenal look” of one’s experience).15
even though the distinction between the two senses of particularity looks 
plausible and also fairly clear, one could wonder why some such distinction 
ought to be drawn in an account of perceptual experience. in my view there 
are at least two reasons. A first one is that, while in general the two senses 
are jointly satisfied, there are cases in which only one of them is present. 
As for the case in which only the phenomenological sense is exemplified, 
one can think of hallucinations. in one such case, even though it may seem 
to the subject as if she is presented with a particular object (and so there is 
phenomenological particularity), there actually is no real object with which 
that experience is related (and so no relational particularity is involved). as 
for the specular case, one can consider a cognitive (that is, non sensory) state 
such a belief for example. While a de re belief (a belief about a given item being 
thus and so) may be taken to exemplify the particularity requirement in its 
relational sense (because what makes that belief the belief it is is its standing 
in an appropriate - maybe, as burge claims,16 contextual, non conceptual - 
relation with the particular item the belief is about), the phenomenological 
sense of the requirement does not seem to apply.17 a second reason of why 
such distinction should be drawn has to do with the different epistemic 
status of our judgments concerning the instantiation of particularity. as far 
as phenomenal particularity is concerned, we cannot be wrong in ascribing it 
to a given mental state we are enjoying: if it seems to one to be presented with a 
“this-such”, then it is true that one is so presented. by contrast, as to the other 
sense of particularity, there is always the possibility of getting wrong in one’s 
15  See e.g. Jackson (1982). in an analogous way, Schellenberg presents the distinction between 
the two senses of particularity in the following way: “a mental state instantiates relational 
particularity if and only if the experiencing subject is perceptually related to the particular 
object perceived. a mental state instantiates phenomenological particularity […] if and only if the 
particularity is in the scope of how things seem to the subject, such that it seems to the subject 
that there is a particular object or a particular instance of a property present” (Schellenberg 
2010, 22-23). 
16  See, e.g. burge (1977).
17  or, at least, not in the same sense in which it applies to sensory states. a distinction which 
could be put to use in this regard is that between sensuous phenomenology and cognitive 
phenomenology. For a defense of the idea that phenomenology extends far beyond the purely 
sensory level see e.g. bayne & montague (2011).
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judgment about one’s being related to a particular item; in this case we do not 
have any “privileged authority” towards judgments whose truth and falsity 
depend not on how things appear to us, but rather on how they actually are. 
Someone could concede that i am right in distinguishing among two different 
senses of particularity and in claiming that there are cases (like hallucinations 
for example) in which only one of them is present and yet object that i am wrong 
in claiming that there is something phenomenological going on in those cases. 
couldn’t it be that what is there at stake is just a belief (a cognitive non sensuous 
state)? as a matter of fact, the objector could claim, an analogue distinction 
applies outside the experiential domain. as regards thoughts, for example, 
there can be cases in which a subject aims at a particular object, but given that 
there actually is no real object, one has only an impression of particularity. in 
such cases, the impression in question can be accounted for in purely cognitive 
non-experiential terms (“your thought purports to refer to something” or 
“you, the thinker, are aiming your thought towards something”);18 that is one 
has a belief (as to there being an object one is thinking about) and this belief 
turns out to be false. my reply to this possible objection against the phenomenal 
nature of the sense of particularity involved is the following: if the impression 
of particularity in the hallucinatory case were something belief-like (as the 
objector is claiming), then that impression would fade out as soon as one were 
told that there is no object one is experientially confronted with, for this is 
precisely what happens with cognitive illusions (they are so to say cognitively 
penetrable). and yet this does not happen in the hallucinatory case. a subject 
suffering from a hallucination as to there being a flying horse floating in the air 
around her may well believe, by being told about, that there actually is no flying 
horse, but still go on having the impression (a strong phenomenological feeling) 
of there being one.19
having introduced the requirements of explanatory adequacy we can now 
rephrase our initial question in the following way. can strong, reductive 
representationalism provide an adequate account of experience and therefore, 
according to (eat), satisfy both (Pr), in its double sense, and (Pir)? in addressing 
this critical issue we shall take into account two varieties of representationalism 
whose main difference has to do with whether perceptual experience has only 
18  For a development of this distinction between thoughts that refer to objects and thoughts 
that merely purport to refer to objects, see crane (2011).
19  actually one could claim that what accounts for this sense of particularity is something 
cognitive (something thought-like) and yet maintain that this does not prevent it from 
being fully phenomenological in so far as one gives room to the idea that besides “sensuous” 
phenomenology there is also “cognitive” phenomenology. the idea that not only there is 
such a thing as cognitive phenomenology, but that it also compenetrates the qualitative 
phenomenology of perceptual experience has been recently defended by montague (2011). 
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one kind or layer of content (unitary content representationalism) or rather 
a multiplicity of them (multiple content representationalism). What we shall 
claim is that if representationalism adopts the unitary content thesis (the 
thesis according to which any experience has at most one content), then if it 
accounts for (Pir) it cannot account for (Pr), neither in the relational, nor in the 
phenomenological sense. by contrast, if representationalism adopts the multiple 
content thesis (the thesis according to which the experience has at least two 
kinds or layers of content), then it can account for both (Pir) and (Prrs), but it 
does not succeed in accounting for (Prps). We shall deal with these two varieties 
of representationalism in the next two sections.
according to this position, perceptual experiences have only one kind of 
content and this content is general (i.e. a kind of content which can be specified 
by using only general terms, that is terms that refer to general features which 
several different individuals can exemplify). Let us confine our attention to 
this claim - which is labeled the “generality claim” (gc) - and try to articulate 
the train of thought which motivates its adoption. there are at least two 
orders of considerations normally adduced to ground (gc): one has to do with 
phenomenology (and in particular with the fact that it is possible for different 
experiences to look indistinguishable to a given subject in so far as she is 
qualitatively appeared to in the same way on both occasions), another one 
with semantics (and in particular with the fact that experiences are assessable 
for correctness on the ground of their having a content). that the content of 
perceptual experiences is general is the claim the representationalist makes in 
the attempt to comply with both kinds of considerations. We can reconstruct 
the train of thought motivating (gc) in the following way: (a) two experiences, e1 
and e2, which are phenomenally indistinguishable (ex: the visual experiences of 
two numerically different, but qualitatively indistinguishable apples, apple1 and 
apple2), must have the same content; (b) e1 and e2, can have the same content 
only if the content in question is not object-involving (that is: only if the object 
the experience is about, apple1 and apple2 respectively, is not a constituent of 
the content of the experience); (c) the only non object-involving content which 
is suited to fix the correctness conditions of the experience is a general content 
(an existentially quantified content of the form “There is an x such that x is an 
apple and x is red”); (d) therefore the content of the experience must be general. 
Steps (a) and (b) are explicit in the following passage from mcginn «…the 
content of experience is not to be specified by using any term that refer to the 
object of experience, on pain of denying that distinct objects can seem precisely 
the same […] we are not to say, when giving the content of the experience, which 
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book it is that is seen» (mcginn 1982, 39). here mcginn commits himself to the 
claim that if two objects can seem the same, then the content of the respective 
experiences cannot be object-involving and must therefore be general. What 
grounds this claim is the idea that the perceptual content of an experience has 
to be a “phenomenal notion” - that is something which accounts for how the 
world seems to the experiencing subject. this point is explicit in this passage 
from davies: 
if perceptual content is, in this sense, “phenomenological content”[…] 
then, where there is no phenomenological difference for the subject, 
there is no difference in perceptual content. if perceptual content is 
phenomenological content then, it seems, it is not object-involving. 
but from this it does not follow that perceptual content is not truth-
conditional – not fully representational; for we can take perceptual 
content to be existentially quantified content (Davies 1992, 25-6).
the two main assumptions behind unitary content representationalism are 
therefore the following:
(a1) if two experiences are phenomenally the same, their content must be 
the same;  
(a2) if the content of two different experiences is the same, then their 
content must be general in form. 
let us now consider whether this kind of representationalism is able to pass 
(eat). as far as (Pir) is concerned it seems that this position has the resources 
to account for it in so far as it conceives of content as something that can be 
shared among people in different environments. of course, one could call into 
question the very strategy of accounting for phenomenal sameness in terms 
of sameness of content, by claiming that it presupposes a substantive point 
left utterly unexplained, namely that the ”what-it-is-likeness” of qualitative 
states amounts to their having a content. even though these perplexities are 
not in our view completely ungrounded, we will leave them aside and grant the 
representationalist the ability to satisfy (Pir). What we want to assess is whether 
he is able to account for the particularity requirement. What we shall claim is 
that insofar as the representationalist adopts (gc) she cannot account neither 
for (Prrs) nor for (Prps). the reason why in our view it does not account for the 
phenomenal sense of particularity is the following: even though this picture 
acknowledges – and how could it be otherwise - that when a subject S sees an 
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object (apple1, say) it is apple1 that S sees and not a generic apple, nonetheless, 
in so far as what appears to her is specified by a general content to the effect 
of there being an apple of a given color, shape and size, this account does not 
succeed in acknowledging the fact that it is a particular item S is presented 
with in having her experience. as we shall say in a moment – and this point 
will require a bit more sophistication – also (Prrs) is not accounted for within 
this picture. of the two failures, however, the former is in our view even more 
severe insofar as it comes from a position which makes use of a notion of 
content explicitly devised to capture the phenomenology of our perceptual 
experience. as a matter of fact, both (Pir) and (Prps) individuate features of 
the overall phenomenology of our experience; these two features, while being 
co-present, seem to push in different directions generating a tension within 
the notion of phenomenal content. the way in which the (unitary content) 
representationalist deals with this tension is by giving priority to (Pir), 
modeling the notion of phenomenal content on this requirement 
let us now move to (Prrs). that in order to account for it one has to abandon 
(gc), is a point which has been argued for by many people. in what follows we 
shall stick to Soteriou’s argument in its support. according to him «those who 
accept an intentionalist account of experience20 should reject this assumption 
[i.e. (GC)] if they want to adopt an account of experience that fits best with our 
ordinary concept of perception. they should reject the generality thesis, and 
they should instead claim that when a subject perceives the world, the subject 
is having an experience with a truth-evaluable content that is object-involving 
» (Soteriou 2000,  175). against (gc) Soteriou puts forward a four steps argument 
whose structure is the following: (1) if one allows the generality claim, then one 
allows the possibility of veridical hallucination; (2) if one allows that veridical 
hallucination is possible, one also allows that veridical misperception is possible; 
(3) but if one allows for this possibility, one must give up an assumption which 
is at the core of our very notion of perception, namely: that if some part of the 
subject’s environment is different from the way that it is represented to be, then 
at least one of the conditions required for the content of the representation to 
be correct is not satisfied. Therefore, (4) if one wants to provide an account of 
experience that fits with our ordinary concept of perception, the generality 
claim should be resisted. 
Let us consider this argument. Its first step registers a claim which almost 
everyone is pretty willing to concede, at least since grice’s famous paper in 1961 
20  Where ‘intentionalism’ is characterized as the claim that a perceptual experience is a 
mental state with an intentional content that represents the world as being a certain way.
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which represents the locus classicus of the discussion on veridical hallucination.21 
in that paper grice devises a thought-experiment in which a neuroscientist 
makes it look to a subject as if there is a clock on the shelf in front of him by 
stimulating the subject’s visual cortex in a situation in which there actually is a 
clock on the shelf. in such a situation, according to grice, even though the world 
fully matches the content of the subject’s experience (and on this ground those 
who adopt (gc) would say that the hallucinatory experience is veridical) one 
should not say that the subject’s experience is veridical for, as a matter of fact, 
the subject is not literally seeing the clock.22 the crucial step in the argument 
is undoubtedly the second one, so let us focus on it.23 What grounds the move 
from 1. (possibility of veridical hallucination) to 2. (possibility of veridical 
misperception)24 is a very straightforward consideration to the effect that 
if we allow that the question of the veridicality of a subject’s experience 
can be settled independently of the question of whether there is an object 
being perceived, we thereby allow that the question of the veridicality 
of an experience can be settled independently of the question of which 
particular object is being perceived. and if we allow that the question 
of the veridicality of an experience can be settled independently of the 
question of which object is being perceived, we thereby allow for the 
possibility of veridical misperception (Soteriou 2000, 179). 
the moral we can draw from these considerations is the following: unitary 
content representationalism, in so far as it adopts (gc), ends up providing 
verdicts of veridicality in cases in which such verdicts are not warranted. 
21  in that paper grice hinges on the fact that the adoption of (gc) implies the admission of 
veridical hallucination in order to argue for a causal theory of perception.
22  grice’s famous consideration in support of this claim is the following: «if X’s impressions 
were found to continue unchanged when the clock was removed or its position altered, then i 
think we should be inclined to say that X did not see the clock that was before his eyes» (grice 
1961, rep. 1988, 238). 
23  the third step is grounded on our ordinary concept of perception and the fourth step is a 
consequence of 1-3.
24  in order to understand what is meant by “veridical misperception” consider the following 
example provided by tye in the context of arguing against (gc) which he labels the “existential 
(content) thesis”: «Suppose i am looking directly ahead, and without my knowledge there 
is a mirror in front of me placed at a 45° angle, behind which there is a yellow cube. off to 
the right of the mirror and reflected in it is a cube that is white in colour. Through special 
lighting conditions, this cube appears yellow to me. according to the existential thesis, in 
these circumstances, my experience is accurate or veridical. it ‘says’ that there is a yellow cube 
located in front of me, and there is such a cube. but i do not see that cube. i see something else, 
something that does not have the properties in question. That cube looks to me other than it 
really is. my experience misrepresents its colour. So my visual experience cannot be counted as 
accurate simpliciter, as the existential thesis requires. it follows that the existential thesis should 
be rejected» (tye 2009, 544).
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the reason why this is so has to do with the fact that this variety of 
representationalism does not account for the particularity requirement. For, 
what is relevant to assess an experience as veridical or unveridical is precisely 
how things are with the particular object one is experiencing. the conclusion 
of this first critical part is that if the representationalist wants to provide 
an account of perceptual experience which does not make violence to our 
ordinary notion of it (and in particular with the idea that what is relevant to 
assess the veridicality of an experience one is enjoying is how things are in the 
portion of the world that appears to one and with which one is experientially 
connected), then she has to account for the particularity requirement at least 
in its relational sense. therefore (gc) has to be abandoned because, as we 
have shown, if that claim is in place, (Pr) is not accounted for. but how could a 
representationalist make such a move while still keeping the assumption that 
phenomenally indistinguishable experiences must have the same content? in 
the next section we shall consider a possible way out that a representationalism 
could take.
it is true that experiences which are phenomenally indistinguishable must have 
the same content (if strong representationalism has to be true) and that in so 
far as the content has to be the same it cannot be object-involving (i.e. it cannot 
have the object the experience is about as one of its constituents). and yet from 
this it does not follow that experiences cannot have an object-involving content, 
unless one also assumes that experiences can only have one kind of content. 
if that assumption is resisted and the “multiple content thesis” is adopted, one 
can claim that two experiences which are phenomenally indistinguishable 
have one and the same non object-involving content (content*) and a different 
object-involving one. With this distinction in place it is possible to claim that 
what accounts for (Pir) and (Pr) are two different kinds of content, respectively: 
content* (phenomenal content) and content simpliciter (truth conditional 
content). 
multiple (indeed dual) content representationalism can come in at least two 
varieties that differ as regards which representationalist assumptions they 
accept as regards phenomenal content (which, in this version, amounts to a 
part of the whole content). While the first assumption of the doctrine (which 
we can now rephrase as a claim concerning only phenomenal content: (a1*) if 
two experiences are phenomenally the same, their content* must be the same) 
is accepted by both – actually, this amounts to the “non negotiable claim” of 
representationalism) - the second one (a2*) - if the content* of two different 
experiences is the same, then that content must be general in form - is accepted 
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only by one of them. So whereas those who accept (a2*) claim that content* 
is general (an existentially quantified content), those who reject it maintain 
that content* is somewhat analogous to the meaning of a demonstrative 
expression. in this way they can claim that this content (or level of content), 
while not being object-dependent or object-involving, is nonetheless object-
related25. the claim that content* is not object-dependent or object-involving 
is what is needed to preserve (a1*). given that our main aim here is to consider 
whether representationalism can satisfy (eat), one of whose requirements is 
(PRps), we shall in the following confine our attention to that variety of dual-
content representationalism which rejects (gc) both for content simpliciter 
and for content*, because this variety seems better fitted to account for (PR) 
in both senses. regarding this variety we shall consider what can be labeled 
“Kaplanian representationalism” or “Kaplanianism” for short.26 the rational 
for the qualification used is that this proposal amounts to a representationalist 
position widely inspired by Kaplan’s theory of indexicals transposed, so to 
say, from the level of linguistic content to the level of mental content. as an 
indexical expression has a fixed character (which accounts for the cognitive 
role of the expression’s type) and a content which (systematically) varies from 
one context of utterance to another (and which accounts for the contribution 
of the expression to the truth-conditions of the sentence in which it occurs), 
so an experience can have an invariant content, content* (which accounts for 
the state’s qualitative/phenomenological dimension) and a different content 
that varies according to the contexts in which the experiential episode occurs 
(and which is relevant to account for the veridicality/correctness/accuracy 
conditions of the experience). that an experience can have both a context 
insensitive content* and context-sensitive veridicality/accuracy/correctness 
conditions is a point which has been paradigmatically defended by burge. 
according to him the content of an experience includes a demonstrative 
element (that) whose referent in any given context is the object which the 
experience is of. 
What we have now to consider is whether this variant of the representationalist 
doctrine is able to account for (eat). as far as (Pir) is concerned, this position 
seems to pass muster, at least as much as the previous variety. also as regard 
(PRrs) things seem, at least at first sight, fine. even though this last claim has 
25  a content is object-related if it is such that a subject could not entertain it if she didn’t 
stand with the object the mental state is about in a peculiar contextual, informational relation. 
a content can be object-related without being object-involving or object-dependent (that is 
without having the object itself as one if its constituents). the reverse does not hold, for object-
involvingness (or object-dependency) implies object-relatedness.
26  this is how tye labels the position put forward by burge (1991). See tye (2009, 549-551).
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been challenged, in so far as burge’s version of Kaplanianism takes content to 
be constituted not by the object the experience is of, but by a demonstrative 
element which stays fix from one context to the other and therefore, according 
to some people, it is not suited to properly account for (Prrs),27 in what follows 
we do not want to insist on this criticism, but to show that, even granting 
that this position can account for (Prrs), it does not satisfy (eat) because it 
does not account for (Prps). our rational for so claiming is the following. even 
though this position is able to account for the role which the object a given 
experience is of plays as regards the specification of the experience’s truth-
conditions, nonetheless, in so far as what is here taken to characterize the 
phenomenological domain is anything but a “purely representational mode of 
presentation” (as a Kaplanian character ultimately amounts to), it follows that 
this account, not unlike the previous one, does not exhibit the right credentials 
to satisfy (Prps). For, how could a Kaplanian character, which is an abstract 
entity with a functional nature, be able to account for a “feeling” (in this case 
a “feeling of particularity”) given that it does not have – and cannot have if 
strong, reductive representationalism has to be true - any phenomenological 
connotation? here strong, reductive represetationalism faces a dilemma: to 
avoid circularity, representational properties have to be characterized without 
reference to phenomenal/qualitative properties, but if no phenomenal mode 
of presentation is introduced, phenomenology is left unexplained.28 how could 
a strong, reductive representationalist face that dilemma in order to try to 
account for phenomenological particularity?
a manoeuvre that a representationalist could at this point perform in 
the attempt to meet (eat) – whose three requirements, as we have seen, 
introduce a tension within the notion of content - is to introduce three 
different layers of content: one to account for (Pir), one to account for 
27  this criticism to burge is explicit in mcdowell. according to him, in so far as burge’s 
position (which he labels the “two component picture of the mind”) tries to account for the 
directedness of mental states to particular objects in terms of an internal component (the 
demonstrative element) - which is only a partial determinant of the state’s aboutness (given 
that one needs context to fix it) - it is ultimately unable to account for (PRrs). To put it in his 
words: «Directedness towards external objects enters the picture only when we widen our field 
of view to take in more than the internal component. So on this conception there is no object-
directed intentionality in cognitive space» (mcdowell 1986, 165). that the only way to account 
for (Prrs) is to adopt an object-involving account of content treating the objects one perceives 
as components (constituents) of the content of one’s perceptual experience is a point which has 
been emblematically defended by Soteriou (2000). the observation which is generally made in 
support of this idea is the following: (i) if i see an object, it must look some way to me; (ii) if an 
object looks some way to me, then it must be experienced as being some way; (iii) the object 
can be experienced as being some way only of it figures in the content of the experience; (iv) 
Therefore, the object must figure in the content of the experience.
28  that there cannot be reduction of the phenomenological domain without circularity is a 
point which has been defended for example by crane (2003) and chalmers (2004).
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(Prrs) and one to account for (Prps). Since both (Pir) and (Prps) have to do 
with the phenomenological domain, what the representationalist needs 
is a two-stage view of phenomenal content,29 with one stage (phenomenal 
content1) accounting for the general aspects of the experience (what 
a given experience can share with other experiences having the same 
phenomenal/qualitative character) and another one (phenomenal content2) 
which accounts for the “feeling of particularity” that accompanies the 
experience. but how could phenomenal content2 be conceived in order 
to account for (Prps)? a possible suggestion comes from mike martin. 
in his view, phenomenal particularity cannot be accounted for unless 
one treats the very object one is presented with as a constituent of the 
state’s phenomenology. according to him, the correct move to take for a 
representationalist who wanted to account for “phenomenal particularity” 
would therefore be to make phenomenology constitutively dependent (at 
least in part) on the particular object perceived.30
in my view this possible proposal,31 no matter how “technically” adequate it could 
be to account for (eat), presents a number of problems which should discourage 
its adoption. First of all, even though it boasts to conform to the phenomenology 
of our experience, in the end it does not seem at all faithful to it in so far as 
our experience does not present itself to us as something having the kind of 
stratified structure that the proposal suggests. Secondly, in so far as this position 
commits itself to a very radically externalist thesis according to which the very 
object a given experience is of is taken as an individuative feature of the state’s 
29  an author who has defended the idea that representationalism needs a two-stage account 
of phenomenal content is chalmers (see chalmers 2006). according to him, there are two levels of 
phenomenal content which he labels “Fregean” and “edenic”. While the latter is meant to mirror 
phenomenal character and to constitute its fundamental nature, the former merely co-varies with 
phenomenal character without mirroring it and without constituting its basic nature. of the two 
levels it is edenic content the one which, in his view, best reflects our first-person phenomenal 
perspective on the external world, whereas Fregean content reflects it only imperfectly. It is worth 
stressing that chalmers’ proposal is a non reductive variant of impure representationalism.
30  martin articulates this position (which he recommends to the representationalist and which he 
himself adopts while not taking himself to be a representationalist, because he denies that experiences 
have a representational content) in terms of the distinction between two aspects of the phenomenology 
of an experience which he labels “phenomenal nature” and “phenomenal character”. he says: «once we 
reflect on the way in which an experience has a subject matter, the presentation of a particular scene, 
then we need a way of making room for the essentially or inherently particular aspects of this as well as 
the general attributes of experience. We need to contrast the unrepeatable aspect of its phenomenology, 
what we might call its phenomenal nature, with that it has in common with qualitatively the same 
experiential events, what we might call its phenomenal character» (martin 2002, 193-194).
31  i qualify this position as ‘possible’ because, as far as i know, it hasn’t been endorsed by 
anyone in the literature. it can be taken as originating by combining suggestions coming 
from chalmers (as regards the distinction between two levels of phenomenal content) with 
suggestions coming from martin (as regards how one should conceive phenomenal content – or 
better, one level of it - in order to account for phenomenal particularity). 
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phenomenal nature,32 it runs the risk of promoting a very implausible picture 
of phenomenology. For, according to this position, two experiences which are 
indistinguishable could nonetheless differ at a given phenomenological level 
(what martin labels “phenomenal nature”, to distinguish from “phenomenal 
character”) despite not only the fact that the subject enjoying the two experiences 
is utterly unable to tell one experience from the other (case of epistemic 
indistinguishability),33 but also, and this is far more troublesome, despite the fact 
that the qualitative properties which are appealed to in the two cases are exactly 
the same (case of ontological indistinguishability). to accept that this could be 
true, is to open the door to the idea that the phenomenological domain could 
turn out to be different from how it presents itself to the subject’s introspective 
access. in other words, that the distinction between appearance and reality could 
have an application also in the phenomenological domain. but in allowing for 
such a possibility, one ends up departing from our very notion of phenomenology, 
replacing it with a very implausible surrogate. So if the representationalist wants 
to provide an account of perceptual experience which does not part company 
from our conception of phenomenology, she should refrain from adopting 
martin’s position. 
actually, the move that martin suggests is in line with the explanatory 
strategy of strong, reductive representationalism in so far as it consists 
in accounting for phenomenological particularity in terms of a property, 
namely the property of being about something which, in turn, is explained in 
purely representational terms (i.e. as the property for a content of having 
the object the state is about as one of its constituents). the substance of 
my criticism against this move is that it ultimately ends up collapsing 
phenomenal particularity onto relational particularity, barring in this 
way the possibility of accounting for the fact that a hallucination, while 
not exhibiting relational particularity, exhibits phenomenal particularity 
nonetheless.34 i think that martin is right in claiming that one cannot 
account for phenomenal particularity in terms of a Kaplanian notion of 
character. and yet i think he is wrong in claiming that the “feeling of 
32  this position is far stronger than the one defended by people such as dretske, tye and 
lycan. For they, while adopting an externalistic individuation of the representational content, 
refrain from providing an object-involving characterization of it.
33  that two experiences can be indistinguishable for a given subject and yet imply different 
qualitative properties (and therefore be phenomenologically different) is attested by the 
phenomenon of “inattentional blindness” (a failure to notice stimuli present in one’s field of vision 
when one’s attention is distracted by some demanding task). For this phenomenon see mack & rock 
(1998). 
34  For a more articulated criticism of martin’s account of phenomenal particularity see 
montague (2011).
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particularity” one enjoys in having a perceptual experience changes so 
long as the object changes. actually, i think that the feeling of particularity 
which accompanies our visual perceptual experiences presents itself as a 
constant, even though not general, feature of our sensory phenomenology, 
something which has to do with the “presentingness” of the particulars we 
meet in our experience. in the last section i shall try to put forward how in 
my view such a feeling of “presentingness” could be accounted for. but let 
me conclude this critical section by considering what i take to be the last 
desperate move that a representationalist could make.
a manoeuvre that a representationalist could at this point perform in 
order to avoid any kind of commitment towards an implausible notion of 
phenomenology (as i claimed is the one that comes from martin’s suggestion) 
is to claim that that the objects which enter into “phenomenal content2” 
and which contribute to individuate the phenomenal character of a given 
experience are such that if the way in which a subject is qualitatively 
appeared to on different occasions in which she is experiencing different 
but qualitatively indistinguishable objects is the same, then the particular 
which figures within that layer of content is the same. Well, would this be a 
viable position for a representationalist to take? in my view even though this 
proposal, which is somewhat in the spirit of martin’s suggestion, if not in the 
letter of it, looks better than the previous one because it does not commit 
itself with an implausible notion of phenomenology, it meets several problems, 
the most serious of which is an awkward ontological commitment towards 
“sensory mind-dependent objects”. let me explain this point. if the object i 
am aware of in e1 and e2 is the same, then, obviously, that object (which is the 
one that figures in phenomenal content2) is neither apple1 nor apple2, but 
rather something which occurs in my experience whenever i happen to be 
related to something having the same “appearance properties” as apple1 and 
apple2. Well, insofar as this proposal would hardly avoid a commitment to a 
form of “sense-datum theory” of experience (for what else could this entity be 
if not a sense-datum?), i think that a representationalist could not accept it (at 
least if she wants also to be a materialist). 
let us take stock. What we have shown in the last two sections is that 
strong and reductive representationalism has problems in accounting for 
(eat). it seems that the attempt to meet the requirements stated ends up 
either in an implausible account of the phenomenology of our experience, 
or in a problematic commitment towards sense data. even though the 
representationalist could put forward an even more sophisticated account 
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than the ones i have here considered,35 i think that the problems we 
have raised should motivate the rejection of the proposal of trying to 
account for phenomenal/qualitative aspects of the experience in terms of 
representational properties. in the next section i shall sketch an alternative 
proposal to account for (eat). according to this proposal, which i shall 
label “Presentationalism”, whereas (Prsr) can be accounted for in purely 
representational terms (namely: in terms of an object-dependent notion 
of content, along the lines indicated by Soteriou), both (Pir) and (Prps) are 
accounted for in terms of a kind of properties different from and not reducible 
to representational properties. i shall label them “presentational properties”. 
Presentationalism, like representationalism, is a position which aims at 
characterizing the nature of the phenomenological dimension (or, as people 
say, the “phenomenal character”) of mental states, that is, that aspect of 
a mental state which is responsible for its “what-it-is-likeness”. according 
to presentationalism, the phenomenal character of a mental state does 
not reside in the state’s representational content (as representationalism 
claims), but rather in the way in which the content is presented to the subject; 
phenomenal character, according to this position, has to do not so much with 
what is represented, but rather with the manner in which what is represented 
is presented to the experiencing subject.36 the phenomenal/qualitative 
properties of a mental state are therefore not representational properties 
(neither pure nor impure). rather they are presentational properties of the 
mental state. but whose properties are these if they are not representational 
properties? to answer this question we need to introduce a distinction 
35  A recent attempt in that direction can be find in Schellenberg (2010) who suggests a Frege-
inspired picture which attempts to keep together the virtues of representationalism and direct 
realism.
36  the position according to which phenomenal character is to be understood not in terms 
of what a conscious experience represents but in terms of how it represents has been labeled 
by Kriegel (see Kriegel 2009) “Fregean representationalism”. about this position, Kriegel claims 
that it is “a rubber duck” (not really a kind of representationalism). i agree with him on this 
point. actually, the correct label would rather be “Fregean presentationalism”. i think it is 
correct to qualify this position as “Fregean” because qualitative features are claimed to play 
the role of modes of presentation: the bluish way it is like for me to see the sky (when i look at 
it in a sunny afternoon) is the manner of presentation of the represented property (the way in 
which the color property of the sky is presented to me). and yet, even though this is a Frege-
inspired position, phenomenal or experiential manners of presentations cannot be identified 
with Fregean Sinne (they play the role of Fregean moPs, but they are not Fregean moPs). First, 
because whereas Fregean senses are ways of thinking, phenomenal manners of presentation are 
ways of experiencing. Second, because the former are ways in which the mind presents to itself 
objects and their properties; the latter are ways in which the objects and their properties present 
themselves to the experiencing subject. third, as we shall see in a moment, because manners 
of presentation do not determine what is represented in a given experiential state: two mental 
states may be about different objects and yet exhibit the same manner of presentation.
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which is widely acknowledged within the philosophy of mind literature, both 
within the analytic tradition and within the phenomenological one, namely 
the distinction between the “matter” and the “quality” of a given mental 
phenomenon, otherwise labeled “intentional content” and “intentional/
psychological mode” - where this latter notion concerns the modality in 
which a given content is entertained (for example: as a belief, as a desire, 
as a visual perception, as an acoustic perception and so on).37 according 
to presentationalism, phenomenal properties are properties of the state’s 
psychological mode.38 
it is standard within the philosophy of mind literature to characterize 
intentional modes in purely functional terms: for a state to have a given 
psychological mode is just a matter of its playing a given causal role in 
the mental state’s economy. in our view, even though the functional 
characterization captures a substantive part of the intentional mode of a 
conscious state, it does not exhaust it. even though two mental states, one 
conscious and the other unconscious, may be associated with the same causal 
role, the intentional mode of a conscious state has also a “subjective dimension” 
that no non-conscious state has. if this is so, then to account for conscious 
mental states one needs a notion of mode “more fine-grained” than the 
functional/causal one. 
according to presentationalism, the subjective dimension of a conscious mental 
state has two components which together constitute the state’s phenomenal 
character, namely: (1) a to-me component and (2) an aspectual component.39 let 
us provide an elucidation of them starting from the former. in any conscious 
mental state something is presented to a subject; the “to-me component” is 
precisely this first-personal “presentingness” which accompanies any conscious 
mental state. this component, while accounting for what makes a state a 
phenomenally conscious state at all, is not responsible for a state being the 
phenomenally conscious state it is, because it is common to all of a subject’s 
phenomenally conscious states. What plays that role is rather the aspectual 
component which captures the way in which what is represented (the state’s 
37  more precisely, by ‘intentional mode’ one means the kind of relation which holds between 
the subject of the mental state and its content. For a clarification of this notion and for the need 
to distinguish between intentional content and mode see crane (2001) and Searle (1983).
38  the idea that the phenomenal character of a conscious state does not reside in the state’s 
content, but in the state’s mode can be traced back to david Woodruff Smith in his seminal paper 
“the Structure of (Self-)consciousness” (1986), and then in his book The Circle of acquaintance 
(1989). 
39  these two components correspond respectively to Kriegel’s “for-me” and “qualitative” 
components, in Kriegel (2009). i qualify as ‘aspectual’ the qualitative component of a mental 
state’s phenomenal character because of the mode-of-presentation role which in my view it 
plays.
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content) is (experientially) presented to the subject of the state. how something 
is (experientially) presented is subjectively oriented, i.e. it is presented from the 
point of view of the subject undergoing the experience. For presentationalism, 
the essence of phenomenality resides precisely in this form of “self-oriented 
experiential aspectuality”. So, what makes the intentional modes of conscious 
states more fine grained than the ones of non-conscious states is the presence 
in the former of an (experientially self-oriented) aspectual component. this 
component is not something which is represented, rather it is something 
which enters into the manner of presentation of the content of a mental 
state. according to presentationalism, phenomenal/qualitative properties are 
therefore manners of presentation of (pure) representational properties.40
let us now consider how presentationalism can satisfy (eat). according to 
this position, the three requirements are not satisfied by a unique kind of 
properties, but by two different though related ones, namely representational 
and presentational properties. Whereas the former account for (Prrs), the 
latter account for both (Pir) and (Prps). (Pir) is accounted for by the aspectual 
component of the phenomenal character, whereas (Prps) is accounted for by the 
to-component. to illustrate this point let us consider the apples example. What 
accounts for the fact that what is relevant for the veridicality of e1 and e2 is how 
things are with apple1 and apple2 respectively is that the object the experience 
is about is a constituent of its very content. being about apple1/apple2 is a 
representational property of e1/e2 respectively, therefore, it is something that 
can be accounted for in purely representational terms. even though the objects 
are different, the two states present the same manner of presentation and this 
is accounted for by the aspectual component of the phenomenal character 
which is the same in the two cases (phenomenal sameness is here accounted for 
in terms of sameness of manners of presentation).41 Finally, what accounts for 
the “feeling of particularity” which accompanies the two conscious experience 
is the to-me component. even though in the two cases i have the impression 
that there is something particular that is phenomenally appearing to me, this 
feeling of particularity does not change from one experience to the other. this 
point is satisfied because the to me-component stays fixed. 
if what we have said so far is correct one can conclude that the whole 
40  For this notion of “manners of presentation” see chalmers (2004). the main difference 
between my account and chalmers’ is that whereas he claims that manners of presentation 
belong to the representational side of the act (while not being fully reducible to purely 
representational properties), i reject any such commitment. For, in my view, by introducing 
phenomenal elements in the state’s content, one runs the risk of “subjectivizing content” in such 
a way as to make it impossible for different subjects to entertain one and the same content.
41  this is the third aspect of difference between manners of presentation and Fregean senses 
we enlightened in note 36.
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representationalist project of accounting for perceptual experiences only in 
terms of representational properties should be rejected, because it is unable 
to account for some minimal requirements of explanatory adequacy which we 
have claimed are not negotiable. moreover, if i am right in claiming that those 
requirements can be accounted for in terms of Fregean presentationalism, 
one can conclude that this position qualifies itself as a better candidate for 
explaining the “double” nature (both representational and qualitative) of 
perceptual experiences. the risk of putting forward an inadequate account 
of content or an inadequate account of phenomenology is here neutralized 
by introducing a distinction between two kinds of properties: whereas 
representational properties account for the state’s representational dimension, 
presentational properties account for the state’s phenomenological dimension.42 
42  Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the XiX congress of the italian 
Society for Philosophy of language, Sense and Sensible, bologna, october 5-7 2012; and at the 
conference Sense and Sensibility, University vita-Salute S. raffaele, January 17-18 2013, milano. i 
thank all the participants to these events for their important comments. i particularly thank 
alberto voltolini whose comments and suggestions have helped me a lot in getting clear on the 
issue of phenomenal particularity.
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